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Measuring the effect of political alignment, platforms, and fake news consumption on voter concern for election processes

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ABSTRACT

Fake news, propagated on social media platforms, is regularly used as a tool to influence political beliefs. In this paper, we investigate the impact of fake news on perceptions of election processes by drawing on the theory of motivated reasoning. We use survey data on partisan alignment, news consumption habits, and voting methods collected before and after the 2020 United States general election. Our pre-election results indicated that political alignment and the type of news a voter consumes influences their trust perceptions of election processes. These findings were replicated in the post-election results. We also found that Facebook users were more likely to consume fake and hyper-partisan news, whereas people who directly navigate to news websites consume primarily mainstream news sources. Implications for research and policy are discussed along with opportunities for future research on the impacts of fake news.

1. Introduction

The weaponization of online platforms to spread blatant, hyper-partisan disinformation has contributed to a current societal crisis. Social media outlets provide individuals a megaphone to circumvent news media and broadcast information targeted at like-minded people who share their attitudes and reinforce their beliefs. Prior research has found that individuals favor information that is consistent with their attitudes (Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017), employing motivated reasoning and skepticism when confronted with difficult subjects (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, and Cook (2012) found this to be especially true among partisan individuals encountering information inconsistent with their beliefs and ideologies. This lack of trust allows individuals to engage in a phenomenon wherein they perceive the news media to be hostile towards their partisan beliefs and compassionate towards their political counterparts' beliefs (Hansen & Kim, 2011; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). Our research explores this intersection of motivated reasoning and platform-enabled disinformation dissemination.

Disinformation and the use of fake news shared through social media have become tools used around the world as a means of creating a narrative that supports the political discourse aligned with a certain diplomatic view. This approach was seen in the Middle East and North

Africa as part of the Arab Spring in the disputes between countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, and Qatar (Emmanouilidou, 2020; Hempel, 2016; Shepp, 2017). In the United States (US), false claims of a rigged election from President Trump were originally published by hyper-partisan news outlets, such as the Western Journal (DeSoto, 2020; Ward, 2020) and Breitbart (Starr, 2020), but then proliferated rapidly via social media. This involved the strategy of repeating (and in many cases retweeting) false claims from unverified sources of rampant fraud, not only with mail-in ballots, but with Dominion voting machines after the election as well. The Trump administration continued to make false claims of voter fraud several weeks after the 2020 presidential election, with few legal experts supporting their position (Merchant & Richer, 2020). Polling in April 2021, five months after the election, suggested that these claims were believed by the conservative electorate, with 81% of Trump voters and 74% of Republicans believing President Biden did not legitimately win the election (The Economist/YouGov, 2021). The use of fake news being pushed through social media can also be seen in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. TikTok, a popular social media platform, has emerged as a place in which false information about the war is commonly spread (Sardarizadeh, 2022). Disinformation is being used intentionally by Russians to control the narrative in their country about what is happening in the war (McCarthy, 2022).

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Platforms as a technology appear to be exacerbating the spread of fake news. In 2018, Facebook recognized the effect its service was having on the spread of these narratives and made dramatic changes to its algorithms to address them. Rather than temper extreme news, their change resulted in an increased amount of toxic and divisive content (Knutson et al., 2021). Additionally, prior research on search algorithms has found that despite innocuous user search terms, conspiracy theories wind up in the results (Long, 2021). The Institute of Strategic Dialogue found search and recommendation algorithms steer users towards extremist disinformation and that digital platforms, such as Facebook and YouTube, can inadvertently aggravate fake news stories and conspiracy theories (Thomas, 2021)

Previous literature has investigated the spread of fake news on platforms (Lazer et al., 2018; Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018) and perceptions of fake news in political contexts (Thaler, 2020; Tsang, 2020). However, less attention has been given to the actual impact of these news consumption behaviors on perceptions of reality. Similarly, there has been information systems (IS) research into design interventions to combat fake news on social media platforms (Kim & Dennis, 2019; Kim, Moravec, & Dennis, 2019; Moravec, Kim, & Dennis, 2020), but less research has measured the actual influence of these platforms on news consumption behaviors. Without knowing the impact on reality, decision making regarding these behaviors assumes that news consumption truly results in adverse behavior. As a result, social media platforms might make decisions on how to filter or influence the news that people consume. However, if these decisions are made based on faulty assumptions, they will not result in the desired change in behavior of those consuming the news. We have insight into the scope and prevalence of the problem, but theorizing and empirical work around the behavioral impact remains underdeveloped. Thus, we have developed the following research question to guide our investigation of fake news, platforms, and trust in democratic institutions:

RQ1. *How does the interaction of fake news, platform technologies, and cognitively biased reasoning influence beliefs regarding election vote counting processes?*

We focus on addressing this question by drawing on the theory of motivated reasoning within the context of the 2020 US presidential election. This context was chosen given the extreme and explicit nature of the use of disinformation during this election cycle. We used survey data on partisan alignment, news consumption habits, and the method by which ballots were cast; data were collected before and after the presidential election. Our pre-election results indicate that political alignment and the type of news a voter consumes influences their trust perceptions of election processes. These findings were replicated in the post-election results, wherein we found a significant effect of voting method; voting method was insignificant in the pre-election study. We conclude our paper by discussing how these results generalize to other political discourses throughout the world.

2. Literature review

An individual's beliefs regarding prominent political figures and emergent issues in society are not the result of mindful deliberation, but instead are automatic, affective responses that shape their information processing and opinion revision (Lodge & Taber, 2013). Lodge and Taber (2013) argue that these affective responses exist in an individual's long-term memory, emerging promptly outside their conscious awareness in response to political stimuli. This political polarization in the US goes beyond how individuals process and react to political stimuli; it also influences where we live. Brown and Enos (2021) found that Americans live in partisan silos, isolating themselves from out-party interactions. Local neighborhoods and communities often share similar partisan views, reinforcing an individual's political ideologies. Within this information systems context, we adapt the theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) as a lens to understand voting beliefs

influenced by the phenomenon of fake news.

2.1. Theory of motivated reasoning

Motivated reasoning suggests that accuracy and directional goals are the primary objectives when processing and evaluating information (Freiling & Waldherr, 2021; Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). People alter how they process information directionally towards desired attitudes and beliefs (Thaler, 2020). Motivated reasoning affords individuals the ability to rely upon cognitively biased reasoning to justify their desired beliefs regardless of evidence that would suggest otherwise (Kunda, 1990). Taber and Lodge (2006) found that an individual's processing of information is biased towards beliefs that the individual previously possessed. Individuals engaged in motivated reasoning attempt to rationalize and build justifications to arrive at their desired conclusion (Kunda, 1990), presenting supporting evidence (Darley & Gross, 1983) and maintaining an "illusion of objectivity" (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) to do so. To support a desired conclusion, individuals utilizing motivated reasoning search their memory for supporting beliefs and may even form new beliefs to bolster that favored conclusion (Kunda, 1990). The process of individuals' belief construction as the result of their memory search is biased by their directional goals (Greenwald, 1980). For example, if an individual believes they are a lucky gambler, they may remember their winnings while overlooking their losses. Furthermore, Kunda (1987) found that individuals may also assemble theories focused on their particular traits that afford them success, ignoring their knowledge to the contrary. Returning to the lucky gambler example, the gambler utilizing motivating reasoning always plays their "lucky numbers" in the lottery despite having never won the jackpot by doing so in the past.

Furthermore, Lodge and Taber (2013) found that individuals are influenced by their emotions, engaging in "hot cognition" when evaluating political figures and instantly creating in- and out-of-group identifications. This cognitive approach involved in motivated reasoning is inconsistent with Bayesian reasoning, where individuals weigh new information using rational calculations (Gerber & Donald, 1999). In the context of politically motivated reasoning, an individual's political commitments influence both their prior beliefs and their bias towards new information (Kahan, 2016). Fueled by the last election cycle, social media websites (e.g., Twitter and Facebook) thrust upon the public persistent exposure to motivated reasoning (e.g., selective exposure, confirmation bias, and disconfirmation bias). For individuals following US politics over the last several years, evidence of motivated reasoning is evident. Individuals' ideologies have been found in prior literature to be biased towards their prior beliefs; moreover, they are inclined to dismiss contradictory opinions and politically controversial topics (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009; Taber & Lodge, 2006). In fact, when individuals are more discerning, they can be even more unrelenting in their ideological beliefs (Nyhan, Reifler, & Ubel, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006). In the current, divisive political environment, individuals increasingly consume news from hyper-partisan outlets that may not have the greatest credibility (Pennycook & Rand, 2019).

2.2. Fake news and motivated reasoning

This disposition towards motivated reasoning is paired with a modern media environment rife with blatant disinformation, oft referred to as fake news. Cambridge dictionary defines fake news as false stories that appear to be news, spread on the internet or using other media, usually created to influence political views or as a joke. Thus, for the purposes of this study, we define fake news as the spread of disinformation, rather than information perceived to be fake due to partisan bias (e.g., van der Linden, Panagopoulos, & Roozenbeek, 2020). Disinformation is defined as "information with deceiving intention," under a broader subset of misinformation, which is simply wrong information (Au, Ho, & Chiu, 2021). Fake news is not a new phenomenon (Mason,

Krutka, & Stoddard, 2018), but modern technology plays a significant role in facilitating its propagation (Lazer et al., 2018). In a study of 126,000 news stories on Twitter, it was found that fake news traveled significantly farther and faster than the truth, especially in cases where that news was political in nature (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Vosoughi et al. (2018) theorize that this is because humans are more likely to spread fake news than are bots. This problem is also not one that emerges from, nor can be solved with, technology alone. In fact, bots appear to spread fake and true news at the same rate on Twitter (Vosoughi et al., 2018). We argue this effect may be partially explained by motivated reasoning activating political identities when sharing said news. This emphasizes the important role of human psychology in the spread and evaluation of all news.

Motivated reasoning is one way that human psychology interacts with the fake news environment. Empirical evidence suggests perceptions of whether news is fake are politically motivated by whether the content of said news aligns with political beliefs (Thaler, 2020; Tsang, 2020). For example, fake news discernment around COVID-19 mediated the relationship between political conservatism and perceived vulnerability to the virus (Calvillo, Ross, Garcia, Smelter, & Rutchick, 2020). Partisanship alone was not the driver of lower perceived vulnerability, but partisanship impacted the ability to discern what news about COVID-19 was fake, leading to a lower perceived vulnerability to the virus. Research findings are mixed on the extent to which motivated reasoning influences perceptions of truth, with some research finding no effect from the source of news (Clayton, Davis, Hinckley, & Horiuchi, 2019; Tsang, 2020) and others finding that the source of the news led to immediate discounting of the information (van der Linden et al., 2020). Conflicting research has found that political extremists are capable of discerning fake news and disinformation (Au et al., 2021), suggesting that considering only political alignment in motivated reasoning is insufficient.

2.3. Theory of motivated reasoning and fake news in the IS context

We draw on the guidance of Hong, Chan, Thong, Chasalow, and Dhillon (2014) for our adaptation of the theory of motivated reasoning to the IS literature. Motivated reasoning is a general theory covering a range of cognitive biases and belief mechanisms (Kunda, 1990), meaning that, for our study, there is not an explicit model of related constructs that was adapted and refined. Instead, we take an approach of positing an identity that is activated by our study context (political alignment and fake news) and how it interacts with the novel IS component (online voting and platforms). Political alignment is our primary tie to motivated reasoning, which previous empirical work supports as a strong driver of motivated reasoning bias (Nyhan et al., 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006).

When contextualizing theory to IS, it is important to be explicit on how technology relates with the source theory (Hong et al., 2014). As such, we include in our contextualization fake news and the social media platforms by which that fake news spreads. Empirical findings suggest partisan alignment directly influences fake news perceptions (van der Linden et al., 2020), and extant research also notes the impact social media platforms have on the spread of fake news (Lazer et al., 2018; Vosoughi et al., 2018). To contextualize this within the IS socio-technical framework (Bostrom & Heinen, 1977a, 1977b), we consider the individual voters and potential voters as the primary social component of interest, specifically, their political alignments, news consumption behaviors, and social media usage behaviors.

We define technology as “a means to fulfill a human purpose,” “an assemblage of practices and components,” and “the entire collection of devices and engineering practices available to a culture” (Arthur, 2009, p. 28). This definition of technology is broad and includes not only engineered artifacts (e.g., accounting software), but also conceptual artifacts (e.g., object-oriented software design patterns). Additionally, existing technologies can be combined to create new, more complex

technologies (Arthur, 2009; Arthur & Polak, 2006). For example, a social media platform could be created from a unique combination of algorithms, web frameworks, and design patterns. As such, not all social media platforms are the same; take, for example, content feeds, with some platforms allowing for chronological timelines (e.g., Twitter) and others only serving content algorithmically determined relevant to the user (e.g., Facebook, TikTok). While social media platforms do have some commonalities with non-digital platforms, our theorization and prior literature (e.g., Medaglia & Zheng, 2017; Wade, Roth, Thatcher, & Dinger, 2020) treat social media platforms as technologies. The technical components for this study are the social media platforms on which fake news is disseminated, personal devices used for online voting, the supporting technical infrastructure that interacts with these devices, and automatic ballot-counting machines. By including the explicit interaction between the social and technical in our theorizing, we offer unique IS insight into motivated reasoning and technology in distorting belief formation.

Fake news is not entirely a political nor psychological phenomenon; it also intersects with issues of technology. In the case of fake news, that technology is social media platforms on which that news is shared. To theorize this, we draw insight from the IS literature. We chose this framing because the field has a strong tradition of socio-technical theorizing (Bostrom & Heinen, 1977a, 1977b; Sarker et al., 2019), emphasizing the importance of both the technology and the social contexts in which technologies are embedded. For this work, individuals using social media platforms as part of their news consumption habits constitute the social component, and the social media platforms themselves are the technical component of the information system. To understand fake news as a socio-technical phenomenon, we apply the theory of motivated reasoning.

The use of the theory of motivated reasoning has been limited in the IS literature. The foundational work of Kunda (1990) has been cited in IS (e.g., Haake, Schacht, Mueller, & Maedche, 2017; Porter, Devaraj, & Sun, 2013) but not directly theorized and empirically tested. Motivation has been theorized as it relates to information search (Browne, Pitts, & Wetherbe, 2007), systems analysis (Appan & Browne, 2012), and systems use (Teo, Srivastava, & Jiang, 2008), but motivation to engage in a behavior is distinct from motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning is a behavioral theory that posits that motivation biases the cognitive processes of accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs (Kunda, 1990). This motivation can be positive (e.g., motivation for high accuracy) or negative in nature, such as motivation to seek out information that only confirms one’s prior beliefs regardless of accuracy (Kunda, 1990). Our work specifically focuses on the latter instantiation of motivated reasoning.

Our research continues within the extant IS research stream on fake news, most notably the consistent empirical findings that confirmation bias influences people to believe fake news (Kim et al., 2019; Kim & Dennis, 2019; Moravec et al., 2020; Moravec, Minas, & Dennis, 2018). Other literature in this area also focuses on the environment from which fake news can emerge (Shirish, Srivastava, & Chandra, 2021) and methods by which fake news can be combatted (Gaozhao, 2021; Kim et al., 2019; Kim & Dennis, 2019; Moravec et al., 2020). We focus less on mitigation strategies and the believability of news and more on the ramifications (Calvillo et al., 2020; Clarke, Chen, Du, & Hu, 2021; Laato, Islam, Islam, & Whelan, 2020) that consumption of fake news has on perceptions of election outcomes.

2.4. The case of the 2020 United States presidential election

The problems of politically motivated reasoning and election outcomes are relevant to all democracies. However, one recent, extreme case in which these issues were relevant was the 2020 US presidential election. While some of the US-specific nuances of this case do not apply to all international democratic elections, the case does provide an interesting instance of intersection between social media technology,

election technology, fake news, and politically motivated reasoning. Both in the lead-up to the election and after it, false claims of a rigged election were spread on social media. The election lent itself well to disinformation, as COVID-19 resulted in election process changes, increased distance voting through methods such as mail, and a president who exploited the situation by pushing false claims about the election. Five months after the election, polling among the conservative electorate showed 81% of Trump voters and 74% of Republicans believed President Biden did not legitimately win the election ([The Economist/YouGov, 2021](#)). We collected data before and after the election, giving an opportunity to measure the effect of these factors on perceptions of election processes.

3. Hypotheses development

Political strategists from both parties credit criticisms from President Trump regarding mail-in voting and expressed concerns about the US Postal Service due to record turnouts for early in-person voting ([Bush, 2020](#)). Additionally, many states provided more opportunities for voting via mail due to COVID-19. As a result, mail-in voting increased from 21% in 2016 to 46% in 2020 ([Stewart III, 2020](#)). Over 159.8 million votes were cast in the 2020 US general election. More Republicans voted early in person, while Democrats cast more votes by mail ([Miao, 2020](#)).

The electoral process is encumbered by voting laws that vary from state to state. This was further exacerbated during the 2020 election cycle due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which forced several states to modify how they handled election day. Many states made changes to their electoral processes, namely how their citizens could cast their vote. The predominant solution was broader acceptance of mail-in voting, with thirty states and the District of Columbia allowing voters to cast mail-in ballots ([Scanlan, 2020](#)). The method by which individuals voted was brought to the forefront of the 2020 US general election by the unfamiliarity of mail-in voting for many individuals, the well-publicized budget problems at the US Postal Service, resulting in slowed mail delivery, and the unrelenting attacks on mail-in voting by some members of Congress. For many people, in-person voting, which they had done in prior elections, provided validation that when their vote was cast, it was assured to be counted; on the other hand, the foreignness of online voting and mail-in ballots lacked that immediate validation. To provide assurance, forty-five states and the District of Columbia provided websites to track a citizen's mail-in ballot to ensure it was received and tallied ([Vote.org, 2021](#)). Yet, prior research suggests that many citizens are unfamiliar with the available e-government services ([Carter & Weerakkody, 2008](#); [Jaeger, 2003](#)), such as ballot tracking ([Fowler, 2020](#); [King, 2019](#)) and online voting ([Parks, 2019](#)). Individuals' lack of awareness and their unwillingness to use e-government services renders these tools largely ineffective ([Ofoeda, Boateng, & Asmah, 2018](#)), despite their potential to increase voter participation ([LeRoux, Fusi, & Brown, 2020](#)).

Seeded by countless attacks of disinformation on social media, many voters were concerned with whether their votes would be counted ([Bergengruen & Villa, 2020](#)). In the days and weeks leading up to the election, former President Trump went as far as urging North Carolina voters to vote both by mail and in person, despite this being illegal, to ensure their vote would be counted ([Murphy & Doran, 2020](#)). Individuals have been found to engage in motivated reasoning when assessing news stories, giving higher credence to news that is favorable to the political party with which they identify ([Thaler, 2020](#)). As a result, election officials have been challenged with combatting distrust of voting by mail, concerns about the accuracy of vote counts with existing voting machines, and ultimately the believability of the election results ([Bergengruen & Villa, 2020](#)). Furthermore, due to affective contagion, people with strong emotional attachments to their beliefs may not reevaluate their perception of reality ([Lodge & Taber, 2013](#)). Election technologies, by their nature, are especially contentious, as the consequences of a security breach call into question the foundations of

legitimate democracy. With current technologies, the expert consensus is that securely voting online is not currently feasible ([National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018](#), p. 106); online voting is also met with harsh criticism by elected officials and industry experts ([Parks, 2019](#)). Additionally, empirical literature suggests virtualizing government processes with high identification and control requirements makes that process less likely to be successfully conducted virtually ([Ofoeda et al., 2018](#)). Thus, we hypothesized the following:

H1a. In-person voting positively influences nonrepudiation, such that concerns about a vote being counted will be lesser compared to alternative methods.

H1b. Voting by mail negatively influences nonrepudiation, such that concerns about a vote being counted will be greater compared to alternative methods.

H1c. Online voting negatively influences nonrepudiation, such that concerns about a vote being counted will be greater compared to alternative methods.

In some states, the government appoints local election officials, and in other states, they are elected to the position. The chief election official, responsible for running the election, is an elected position in twenty-four states, appointed by the governor in five states, and selected by the legislature in three states. At the local level, this can differ even further. For example, in Nebraska, counties with fewer than 20,000 residents have an elected individual who runs the election, counties with >20,000 residents but fewer than 100,000 have their election official appointed by the county board, and counties with over 100,000 residents have their election official appointed by the governor ([National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020](#)).

Previous work in motivated reasoning has shown political partisanship to be a strong driver in biased belief formation ([Lodge & Taber, 2013](#); [Nyhan & Reifler, 2010](#); [Taber et al., 2009](#)). With a two-party system, electorates in the US experience more continuing support than their colleagues in multi-party systems ([Boyer, Aaldering, & Lecheler, 2020](#)). Specifically, in the US, political attitudes are largely shaped by identifying as either a Democrat or a Republican ([Goren, 2005](#)). So, the desire of an individual to reaffirm their partisan group's values and ideas instead of their own prior attitudes is the result of motivated reasoning ([Leeper & Slothuus, 2014](#); [Petersen, Skov, Serritzlew, & Ramsøy, 2013](#)). Since the governor is an elected office, held by one of the two primary political parties in most cases, we predict that governor appointment of an election official would be viewed as a political action, activating partisan identity. Thus, we hypothesize the following:

H2a. Governor-appointed officials negatively influence the nonrepudiation of ballot counts, such that concerns about mail-in votes being counted correctly will be greater compared to alternative methods.

President Trump made false claims that election officials in Philadelphia would not allow Republicans access to observe vote counting ([Rizzo, 2020](#)). He also went on to make unfounded claims of widespread election fraud, attacking fellow Republican leaders and election officials in Georgia and Arizona ([Heath & Martina, 2020](#)). Moreover, President Trump pleaded with and then attempted to bully Georgia election officials to find him 11,780 votes by recalculating the tally ([Smith, Jester, & Thompson, 2021](#)). There are legitimate concerns with voting by mail, such as lost ballots, voter errors, privacy loss, disenfranchisement, and coercion ([Miller, 2020](#); [Scattergood, 2020](#); [Yasinsac, 2012](#)). However, the amount of fraud that occurs with mail-in ballots has been, and remains, very low ([Weiser & Ekeh, 2020](#)). The disinformation campaign undertaken by former President Trump and others via social media is unfounded; however it is operating in a context of already-dismal levels of trust in government ([Pew Research Center et al., 2019](#)).

This disinformation and low trust level are further combined with motivated reasoning. Whether people believe disinformation is in part

based on how it aligns with their political beliefs (Thaler, 2020; Tsang, 2020; van der Linden et al., 2020). Peterson and Iyengar (2021) found support for motivated reasoning in the response to disinformation; partisans sought out agreeable information and adopted beliefs favorable to their party affiliation. Especially in political contexts, people are more likely to anchor to their ideology (Nyhan et al., 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006). We expect that people will be more concerned about their vote being counted if officials are governor-appointed, as this will activate these political identities. If ballot counting is instead conducted by a neutral third party of officials selected through bipartisan consensus, this political identity is less likely to be activated, and as such, people will be less likely to engage in motivated reasoning about the efficacy of the counting process. Thus, we hypothesize the following:

H2b. A neutral third party positively influences the nonrepudiation of ballot counts, such that concerns about the votes being counted correctly will be lesser compared to alternative methods.

Boyer (2021) found that news consumption exacerbates motivated reasoning by negative affect and is further heightened for individuals simultaneously experiencing high levels of provocation. In the days and weeks following Election Day, President Trump and the conservative news outlets continued their attacks on the integrity of the election with accusations of fraud revolving around the Dominion voting machine algorithms. Fueled by social media, President Trump pushed conspiracy theories backed by baseless claims that Dominion deleted 2.7 million Trump votes nationwide (Giles & Horton, 2020). President Trump's claim that 941,000 Dominion votes were deleted in Pennsylvania led some Republican lawmakers to question the election process (Fearon, 2020). Further, President Trump tweeted Dominion voting machines in Michigan changed the results of the election with an error rate of 68 % (Subramaniam, 2020). The disinformation being circulated on social media about election rigging led Dominion Voting Systems to request that Facebook, Twitter, Parler, and YouTube preserve posts and data from conservative news media outlets while pursuing defamation claims (Coster, 2021). Consistent with motivated reasoning, individuals' strong emotional attachments to their partisan beliefs are linked to their assessment of facts (Lodge & Taber, 2013; Weir, 2017). Furthermore, prior research has found that individuals with higher education and knowledge levels are more likely to engage in politically motivated reasoning (Kahan, 2016). Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:

H2c. Vote counting machines negatively influence the nonrepudiation of ballot counts, such that concerns about votes being counted correctly will be greater compared to alternative methods.

Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, and Hamann (2006) found that if individuals experience a strong emotion during prior motivated reasoning and that emotion is salient when they reach their conclusion, a strong emotional stake is then attached to the conclusion and any subsequent, new information will cause motivated reasoning to reoccur. Lodge and Taber (2013) referred to this as the affective contagion infecting an individual's ability to draw conclusions without strong emotions being elicited when encountering facts contradicting their prior conclusions. Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson (2010) found that emotions influence an individual's perception of facts. This was prevalent in the US during the Obama administration regarding skepticism about the legitimacy of his birth-right citizenship despite copious evidence (Redlawsk, 2011). This was also the case during the 2020 US general election regarding mail-in voting (Parks, 2020a) and voter fraud (Corasaniti, Epstein, & Rutenberg, 2020).

The consumption of hyper-partisan news can lead to individuals reading more fake news in search of "facts." The theory of motivated reasoning posits that when driven to arrive at a particular conclusion, an individual's memory, their information sought, and their knowledge obtained become more consistent with their self-serving conclusions (Kunda, 1990). This is true regarding the consumption of hyper-partisan news, where facts are deemed factual by the partisan viewership largely

because of the messenger, regardless of evidence to the contrary. The current news environment is becoming increasingly partisan, with a growing number of media outlets being considered hyper-partisan. This is especially true with conservative news, as evidenced by the number of hyper-partisan conservative media outlets as compared to their liberal counterparts (Pennycook & Rand, 2019). The most fervent viewers of conservative news are more likely to further anchor on their prior conclusions in a news environment in which their emotions and conclusions are reinforced. Thaler (2020) found that, compared to neutral topics, individuals who employed motivated reasoning were more likely to believe fake news regarding politicized topics. Motivated reasoning dictates an individual's beliefs and their rules of inference, which then guide their search for information in directions that support their prior convictions (Kunda, 1990). In the political space, people create in- and out-of-group identifications, which causes them to anchor more strongly in their given political beliefs (Lodge & Taber, 2013). Because the most avid of political information-seeking individuals engage in motivated reasoning to seek out information in alignment with their partisan beliefs (Peterson & Iyengar, 2021), we hypothesize that news consumption influences concern about votes being counted properly.

H3a. Consumption primarily of mainstream news positively influences nonrepudiation of ballot counts, such that concerns about votes being counted properly will be lesser compared to alternative methods.

H3b. Consumption primarily of hyper-partisan news negatively influences nonrepudiation of ballot counts, such that concerns about votes being counted properly will be greater compared to alternative methods.

H3c. Consumption primarily of fake news negatively influences nonrepudiation of ballot counts, such that concerns about votes being counted properly will be greater compared to alternative methods.

The theory of motivated reasoning establishes that people's beliefs are influenced by information's alignment with their starting position, this starting position being an individual's attitude "root," comprising their underlying fears, ideologies, worldviews, and identity needs that sustain and motivate their specific attitudes (Hornsey & Fielding, 2017). As this is particularly salient with partisan beliefs, people will likely either feel their beliefs are confirmed by those political views that align with their initial beliefs or strongly disagree with political views that are contrary to their initial beliefs (Kahan, 2016). This can be observed in the results of President Trump's two presidential campaigns. President Trump won the 2016 election by way of the electoral college; however, he lost the popular vote, which led him to make baseless claims on Twitter that millions voted illegally in person (Parks, 2020b). In 2020, for months leading up to the November 3 general election, President Trump and his allies within the Republican party bemoaned that mail-in ballots would lead to widespread voter fraud (Mitropoulos, 2020). In September 2020, while campaigning in Nevada, President Trump again repeated baseless claims that mail-in ballots would lead to widespread voter fraud because Democrats were sending ballots to everybody but Republican voters—even to dogs (Lozano, 2020). To sow doubt about mail-in voting, in the months leading up to the 2020 election, Trump lawyers brought litigation against states using claims and theories that, according to a voting rights expert at New York University, would undoubtedly not be accepted in court and were written to send a message rather than win the lawsuit (Ball, 2021). President Trump continues to make public comments about the election being stolen while ridiculing individuals who accept the election results (Weiner & Hsu, 2021). Bisgaard (2019) found that partisan individuals might acknowledge contradictory facts, but this leads them to produce attributional arguments through motivated reasoning that align with their ideologies. Despite a void of evidence supporting such claims, 60% of Republicans believed that the 2020 US general election was stolen from President Trump three months after he had left office (Oliphant & Kahn, 2021). In the first half of 2021, while continuing to make baseless claims that the election was stolen from him, Trump raised over \$100 million, showing the power he

wields over the Republican party (Stanley-Becker & Narayanswamy, 2021). Based on the attachment of the Republican party to Trump and the influence this has on the perception of facts (Goethals, 2021), we hypothesize the following:

H4. Political alignment influences concern about votes being counted properly, such that in the 2020 election, Republicans (Democrats) were more (less) concerned about their votes being counted properly compared to prior elections.

4. Research method

4.1. Sampling and data collection

This research consists of three studies: two experimental, scenario-based surveys conducted prior to the 2020 presidential election and one post-election survey. Participants in each study were US citizens eligible to vote in the 2020 presidential election. Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The use of MTurk poses certain challenges for research validity, namely accessing qualified candidates and validating collected data (Hunt & Scheetz, 2019). To address these issues, we only surveyed users with a 95% approval history and dropped any participants that failed the attention check in the surveys. After dropping participants, the survey was re-opened to MTurk users who had not previously taken the survey to collect additional responses. Participants could not take both pre-election surveys (study 1 and study 2); however, the participants in those surveys were not excluded from the post-election survey (study 3). Please see Appendix B for the demographic information and Appendix C for the descriptive statistics of each study. The experiments were not pre-registered for this research but were approved by the researchers' institutional review boards.

4.2. Measures

Our media consumption scale was partially adapted from Calvillo et al. (2020). We used their six labels of *none*, *very little*, *some*, *majority*, *most*, and *all* (coded 0 to 5) to determine how much news an individual consumed from a given source. Calvillo et al. (2020) pulled their news sources from Pennycook and Rand (2019), only including mainstream and hyper-partisan news sources. Our scale differs in that we used all 60 web news sources (20 mainstream, 20 hyper-partisan, and 20 fake news) from Pennycook and Rand (2019). The order of questions for each scale were randomized to control for potential ordering effects. The final scale used, unique to the third study, is a measure of how participants reached each of the news sources. This question consisted of four sliders (Facebook, Twitter, Direct Navigation, and Other) that sum to 100%. Please see Appendix A for the item text of all the adapted and developed measures.

4.3. Analysis

We used SPSS version 27.0.0.0 to conduct the analysis for this paper. For studies 1 and 2, we conducted three one-way ANOVA analyses with post-hoc Bonferroni tests to identify significance. For study 3, we conducted one-way ANCOVA analyses. Since study 3 did not have random assignment, there were demographic differences in the chi-square analysis, leading us to add control variables as covariates to the statistical analysis.

The political alignment groupings are Republican (Strong Republican + Lean Republican), Democrat (Strong Democrat + Lean Democrat), and Independent. For news consumption, we averaged the scores by news type and assigned the participant to whichever group they scored the highest. For example, if a participant on average consumed more news from mainstream sources than hyper-partisan and fake news sources, they were assigned to the mainstream group for the analyses.

Previous research has found that, generally, those that disseminate fake news are generally older and more conservative (Guess, Nagler, & Tucker, 2019). The results of two of our studies replicate the findings on the relationship between conservatism and mainstream versus fake news consumption (Study 1 Mean Difference = 1.490, $p = .003$; Study 2 Mean Difference = 0.873, $p = .207$; Study 3 Mean Difference = 1.650, $p < .001$). However we did not find the same age effect.

5. Study 1 – Pre-election voting method comparison

5.1. Procedure

The first study was conducted before the 2020 US election as an experimental scenario survey with a three-group between-subjects design. Data were collected through MTurk on October 21, 2020. The experiment presented participants with a scenario that proposed voting method changes due to COVID-19 precautions. The experimental groups were voting socially distanced in-person, via mail, and online. Which scenario was presented to each participant was randomly assigned.

After reading the scenario, participants answered a question about how concerned they were about their votes being counted properly in the election, how much news they consume from various web sources, and some demographic questions. In total, after removing responses with failed attention checks, there were 206 valid responses, with the in-person voting group consisting of 77 respondents, the mail voting group consisting of 62 respondents, and the online voting group consisting of 67 respondents.

5.2. Results

Before conducting our hypothesis tests, we first validated the scales. We used Cronbach's alpha as a test of the internal consistency of the adapted constructs (Peterson, 1994). All the constructs were above the 0.7 threshold (mainstream news consumption $\alpha = 0.976$; hyper-partisan news consumption $\alpha = 0.990$; fake news consumption $\alpha = 0.991$).

Table 1 presents the ANOVA results for study 1. The ANOVA for voting method was not statistically significant ($F(2,203) = 2.422$, $p = .091$, $\eta^2 = 0.023$, Power = 0.484). Thus, H1 was not supported for study 1. We also found statistical significance for the ANOVA comparing the effects of political alignment ($F(2, 203) = 4.445$, $p = .013$, $\eta^2 = 0.042$, Power = 0.760). For the ANOVA comparing the effects of news consumption type, we did find statistical significance ($F(2, 203) = 5.412$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = 0.051$, Power = 0.841).

Based on this, we conducted post-hoc Bonferroni tests, presented in Table 2. We found that participants who primarily consumed mainstream news had lower levels of concern about votes being counted correctly than those who primarily consumed fake news ($M = 3.23$ vs. 4.05, $SE_{diff} = 0.32$, $p = .031$), supporting H3. There was a significant difference between Republicans and Independents ($M = 3.68$ vs. 2.94, $SE_{diff} = 0.27$, $p = .021$). However, our hypothesized difference between Republicans and Democrats (H4) was not statistically significant for study 1 ($M = 3.68$ vs. 3.26, $SE_{diff} = 0.20$, $p = .108$).

6. Study 2 – Pre-election mail counting comparison

6.1. Procedure

The second study was conducted before the election as an experimental scenario survey with a three-group between-subjects design. Data were collected through MTurk on October 21, 2020 (the same day as for study 1). The experiment presented participants with a scenario that proposed all voters would be using mail ballots due to COVID-19 precautions. The experimental groups manipulated how the mail ballots were counted. The first group was governor-appointed counters, the second group was neutral counters selected through bipartisan agreement, and the third group was a voting machine counting the ballots.

Table 1
Study 1 ANOVA Results.

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	η^2	<i>p</i>	Power	Levene's Statistic	Levene's <i>p</i>
Voting Method	2, 203	2.422	0.023	0.091	0.484	0.42	0.66
News Consumption	2, 203	5.412***	0.051	0.005	0.841	22.05	<0.001
Political Alignment	2, 203	4.445*	0.042	0.013	0.760	0.61	0.55

* *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001

Table 2
Study 1 Bonferroni Post-hoc Tests.

News Consumption				
Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference (Group 1–2)	<i>SE_{diff}</i>	<i>p</i>
Mainstream	Hyper-partisan	−0.624	0.267	0.06
	Fake	−0.820*	0.316	0.03
Hyper-partisan	Mainstream	0.624	0.267	0.06
	Fake	−0.195	0.387	1.00
Fake	Mainstream	0.820*	0.316	0.03
	Hyper-partisan	0.195	0.387	1.00

Political Alignment				
Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference (Group 1–2)	<i>SE_{diff}</i>	<i>p</i>
Democrat	Republican	−0.417	0.198	0.11
	Independent	0.329	0.274	0.69
Republican	Democrat	0.417	0.198	0.11
	Independent	0.746*	0.273	0.02
Independent	Democrat	−0.329	0.274	0.69
	Republican	−0.746*	0.273	0.02

* *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001

Which scenario was presented to each participant was randomly assigned.

After reading the scenario, participants answered a question about how concerned they were about their votes being counted properly in the election, how much news they consume from various web sources, and some demographic questions. In total, after removing responses with failed attention checks, there were 234 valid responses, with the governor-appointed counters group consisting of 68 respondents, the neutral counters group consisting of 71 respondents, and the machine-counted mail ballots group consisting of 95 respondents.

6.2. Results

Before testing our hypotheses, we first validated the scales used for convergent and discriminant validity and reliability. We first used Cronbach's alpha as a test of the internal consistency of the adapted constructs (Peterson, 1994). All the constructs were above the 0.7 threshold (mainstream news consumption $\alpha = 0.974$; hyper-partisan news consumption $\alpha = 0.992$; fake news consumption $\alpha = 0.992$).

Table 3 presents the ANOVA results for study 2. The ANOVA for mail ballot counting method was not statistically significant ($F(2,231) = 2.417, p = .091, \eta^2 = 0.021, \text{Power} = 0.484$). Thus, H2 was not supported for study 2. For the ANOVA comparing the effects of news consumption type, we did find statistical significance ($F(2, 231) = 6.088, p$

Table 3
Study 2 ANOVA Results.

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	η^2	<i>p</i>	Power	Levene's Statistic	Levene's <i>p</i>
Counting Method	2, 231	2.417	0.021	0.091	0.484	0.39	0.68
News Consumption	2, 231	6.088**	0.050	0.003	0.884	17.44	<0.001
Political Alignment	2, 231	6.004**	0.025	0.049	0.879	3.73	0.003

* *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001.

$= .003, \eta^2 = 0.050, \text{Power} = 0.884$). We also found statistical significance for the ANOVA comparing the effects of political alignment ($F(2, 231) = 6.004, p = .025, \eta^2 = 0.049, \text{Power} = 0.879$).

Based on this, we conducted post-hoc Bonferroni tests, presented in Table 4. We found that participants who primarily consumed mainstream news had lower levels of concern about votes being counted correctly than those who consumed primarily hyper-partisan news ($M = 3.20$ vs. $4.03, SE_{diff} = 0.25, p = .003$), supporting H3. There was a significant difference between Republicans and Independents ($M = 3.68$ vs. $2.88, SE_{diff} = 0.26, p = .007$) as well as between Republicans and Democrats ($M = 3.68$ vs. $3.19, SE_{diff} = 0.18, p = .026$), providing support for H4 in study 2.

7. Study 3 – Post-election voting method and platform comparison

7.1. Procedure

The third study was a survey study with no experimental manipulations. Data were collected through MTurk after the election on April 16, 2021. Rather than assigning participants to groups, participants self-selected based on the actual method they used to vote in the election. The groups were the same as in study 1, with participants able to select voting in person, by mail, or via the internet.

Table 4
Study 2 Bonferroni Post-hoc Tests.

News Consumption				
Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference (Group 1–2)	<i>SE_{diff}</i>	<i>p</i>
Mainstream	Hyper-partisan	−0.833**	0.250	0.003
	Fake	−0.448	0.326	0.512
Hyper-partisan	Mainstream	0.833**	0.250	0.003
	Fake	0.385	0.388	0.967
Fake	Mainstream	0.448	0.326	0.512
	Hyper-partisan	−0.385	0.388	0.967

Political Alignment				
Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference (Group 1–2)	<i>SE_{diff}</i>	<i>p</i>
Democrat	Republican	−0.483*	0.182	0.026
	Independent	0.316	0.256	0.657
Republican	Democrat	0.483*	0.182	0.026
	Independent	0.799**	0.261	0.007
Independent	Democrat	−0.316	0.256	0.657
	Republican	−0.799**	0.261	0.007

* *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001

After selecting what voting method they used, participants answered a question about how concerned they were about their votes being counted properly in the election, how much news they consume from various web sources, and some demographic questions. An additional question unique to study 3 asked participants to indicate what percentage of their news is accessed through direct navigation, Twitter, Facebook, or other platforms. In total, after removing responses with failed attention checks, there were 311 valid responses, with the in-person voting group consisting of 217 respondents, the mail voting group consisting of 82 respondents, and the internet voting group consisting of 12 respondents.

7.2. Results

Before testing our hypotheses, we first validated the scales used for convergent and discriminant validity and reliability. We used Cronbach’s alpha as a test of the internal consistency of the adapted constructs (Peterson, 1994). All the constructs were above the 0.7 threshold (mainstream news consumption $\alpha = 0.977$; hyper-partisan news consumption $\alpha = 0.991$; fake news consumption $\alpha = 0.991$). In part because participants were not randomly assigned, our chi-square tests of the demographic variables were significant for the liberal-conservative ($p = .001$), Democrat-Republican ($p = .03$), church attendance ($p < .001$), and education ($p = .01$) measures. To resolve this, we conducted two one-way ANCOVAs and one one-way ANOVA using conservatism, church attendance, and education measures as covariates. We did not include the Democrat-Republican measure as part of the covariates, as this scale was already used to construct the party group independent variable in the ANOVA analyses.

We also did not use the same covariates for each ANCOVA, as some of the covariates were significantly correlated with the independent variable (Khammar, Yarahmadi, & Madadzadeh, 2020; Schneider, Avivi-Reich, & Mozuraitis, 2015). For voting method, we conducted a one-way ANCOVA controlling for conservatism ($p = .076$) and education ($p = .303$) but not for church attendance ($p = .034$). For the news consumption analysis, we used a one-way ANOVA, as conservatism ($p < .001$), church attendance ($p < .001$), and education ($p < .001$) were all significantly correlated with a participant’s news consumption group. For political alignment, we conducted a one-way ANCOVA controlling for church attendance ($p = .240$) and education ($p = .219$) but not for conservatism ($p < .001$).

Table 5 presents the ANCOVA and ANOVA results for study 3. The ANCOVA for voting method was statistically significant ($F(2, 306) = 5.561, p = .004, \eta^2 = 0.035, Power = 0.853$). For the ANOVA comparing the effects of news consumption type, we found statistical significance ($F(2, 308) = 37.309, p < .001, \eta^2 = 0.195, Power = 1.000$). We also found statistical significance for the ANCOVA comparing the effects of political alignment ($F(2, 306) = 11.412, p = .001, \eta^2 = 0.048, Power = 0.948$).

Based on this, we conducted post-hoc Bonferroni tests, presented in Table 6. For voting method, we found support for H1c, with individuals who voted online having more concern about vote counting than individuals who voted by mail ($M = 3.48$ vs. $2.27, SE_{diff} = 0.398, p = .008$). For news consumption, we found support for H3, with individuals consuming primarily hyper-partisan news ($M = 3.66$ vs. $2.23, SE_{diff} = 0.22, p < .001$) and fake news ($M = 4.12$ vs. $2.23, SE_{diff} = 0.29, p < .001$) being significantly more concerned than people who consumed primarily mainstream news sources. For political alignment, we found

Table 5 Study 3 ANCOVA and ANOVA Results.

	df	F	η^2	p	Power	Levene’s Statistic	Levene’s p
Voting Method	2, 306	5.561**	0.035	0.004	0.853	1.037	0.356
News Consumption	2, 308	37.309***	0.195	<0.001	1.000	20.563	<0.001
Political Alignment	2, 306	11.412**	0.048	0.001	0.948	1.002	0.368

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 6 Study 3 Bonferroni Post-hoc Tests.

Voting Method		Mean Difference (Group 1–2)	SE_{diff}	p
Group 1	Group 2			
In-Person	Mail	0.393	0.168	0.060
	Internet	-0.817	0.374	0.089
Mail	In-Person	-0.393	0.168	0.060
	Internet	-1.210**	0.398	0.008
Internet	In-Person	0.817	0.374	0.089
	Mail	1.210**	0.398	0.008
News Consumption		Mean Difference (Group 1–2)	SE_{diff}	p
Group 1	Group 2			
Mainstream	Hyper-partisan	-1.428***	0.224	<0.001
	Fake	-1.889***	0.288	<0.001
Hyper-partisan	Mainstream	1.428***	0.224	<0.001
	Fake	-0.461	0.343	0.540
Fake	Mainstream	1.889***	0.288	<0.001
	Hyper-partisan	0.461	0.343	0.540
Political Alignment		Mean Difference (Group 1–2)	SE_{diff}	p
Group 1	Group 2			
Democrat	Republican	-0.517**	0.166	0.006
	Independent	-0.577**	0.185	0.006
Republican	Democrat	0.517**	0.166	0.006
	Independent	-0.060	0.213	1.000
Independent	Democrat	0.577**	0.185	0.006
	Republican	0.060	0.213	1.000

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

support for H4, with participants who identify with the Democrat party having less concerns about votes being properly counted than both Republican ($M = 2.33$ vs. $2.85, SE_{diff} = 0.17, p = .006$) and Independent ($M = 2.33$ vs. $2.91, SE_{diff} = 0.19, p = .006$) voters.

As part of the post-election study, we also collected data on what platforms people were using to access various news sources. We conducted four post-hoc one-way ANOVAs, with our dependent variables being percentage of news accessed through the platform and the factor being what news the voter primarily consumes. The independent variable for all four ANOVAs was news consumption group. We did not use an ANCOVA analysis for this post-hoc, as the same issues with conservatism ($p < .001$), church attendance ($p < .001$), and education ($p < .001$) being significantly correlated with a participant’s news consumption group exist for this data.

Table 7 presents the ANOVA results for the platforms analysis. For Facebook ($F(2, 308) = 9.688, p < .001, \eta^2 = 0.059, Power = 0.982$) and direct navigation ($F(2, 308) = 7.670, p = .001, \eta^2 = 0.047, Power = 0.947$), we find a significant difference across news groups. The ANOVAs for Twitter ($F(2, 308) = 1.887, p = .153, \eta^2 = 0.012, Power = 0.391$) and other platforms ($F(2, 308) = 0.319, p = .727, \eta^2 = 0.002, Power = 0.101$) were not statistically significant.

Based on these results, we conducted post-hoc Bonferroni tests to check the individual comparisons presented in Table 8. These results show that, on average, people who primarily consume more fake news

Table 7
Study 3 ANOVA Results.

	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	η^2	<i>p</i>	Power	Levene's Statistic	Levene's <i>p</i>
Facebook	2, 308	9.688***	0.059	<0.001	0.982	8.05	<0.001
Twitter	2, 308	1.887	0.012	0.153	0.391	12.65	<0.001
Direct	2, 308	7.670**	0.047	0.001	0.947	35.46	<0.001
Other	2, 308	0.319	0.002	0.727	0.101	7.60	<0.001

* *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001.

Table 8
Study 3 Platform Bonferroni Post-hoc Tests.

Facebook				
Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference (Group 1–2)	<i>SE_{diff}</i>	<i>p</i>
Mainstream	Hyper-partisan	-15.025**	3.967	0.001
	Fake	-13.634*	5.085	0.023
Hyper-partisan	Mainstream	15.025*	3.967	0.001
	Fake	1.391	6.062	1.00
Fake	Mainstream	13.634*	5.085	0.023
	Hyper-partisan	-1.391	6.062	1.00
Direct				
Group 1	Group 2	Mean Difference (Group 1–2)	<i>SE_{diff}</i>	<i>p</i>
Mainstream	Hyper-partisan	15.043**	5.053	0.009
	Fake	18.677*	6.477	0.013
Hyper-partisan	Mainstream	-15.043**	5.053	0.009
	Fake	3.634	7.722	1.00
Fake	Mainstream	-18.677*	6.477	0.013
	Hyper-partisan	-3.634	7.722	1.00

* *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001.

(*M* = 36.20 vs. 22.57, *SE_{diff}* = 5.09, *p* = .023) and hyper-partisan news (*M* = 37.59 vs. 22.57, *SE_{diff}* = 3.967, *p* = .001) than mainstream news consume significantly more of their news on Facebook than on other platforms. We observe the opposite effect for people who consume primarily mainstream news. On average, people who consumed significantly more mainstream news than hyper-partisan news (*M* = 40.16 vs. 25.11, *SE_{diff}* = 5.05, *p* = .009) and fake news (*M* = 40.16 vs. 21.48, *SE_{diff}* = 6.48, *p* = .013) consume significantly more of their news through direct navigation to websites.

8. Discussion

The results of study 1 suggest that, at least in the pre-election context, the method an individual used to cast a vote had no influence on their concern about votes being counted properly. Similarly, we did not find a significant difference between the two partisan groups, although we did find a difference between Republicans and Independents. However, we found evidence that news consumption habits influenced trust in the vote counting process leading up to the election, with individuals primarily consuming fake news having higher concern levels than those consuming news from mainstream sources.

Through our manipulation of mail ballot vote counting, study 2 shows that, at least in the pre-election context, the design of the vote counting process had no influence on concern about votes being counted properly. Unlike in study 1, we found a significant difference between Republicans and Democrats for the mail-in ballot context. We did not replicate the fake news result from study 1; however, we did find that hyper-partisan news consumers had significantly higher concern than mainstream news consumers. These two results could potentially be explained by how mail-in ballots had been turned into a partisan issue leading up to the election (Bergengruen & Villa, 2020; Parks, 2020b), activating the salient political identities with respect to trusting the vote

counts. A potential alternative explanation for the insignificant result between the different mail-in ballot counting hypotheses may be an example of lack of reasoning rather than motivated reasoning. Previous research has found that people often fall victim to fake news due to lack of reasoning (Pennycook & Rand, 2019, 2021). The counting hypotheses made political actors salient in the experiment scenario, so the lack of significant results potentially suggests that motivated reasoning played no part in the belief formations.

The results of study 3 provide further confirmation for the result from study 1 that people who consume primarily fake news have more concern about votes being counted properly. We also replicated the results from study 2 suggesting that hyper-partisan news consumers have more concern, as well as a partisan effect of Republicans being more concerned about votes being counted properly.

The platforms results grant insight into how potential voters get to different information sources and not just the effects of those information sources. These results indicate that social media platforms (in this case, Facebook) are making these fake news sources and hyper-partisan news sources available. This is further corroborated by the fact that primarily mainstream news consumers directly navigate to news websites rather than going through a social media intermediary. This requires them to know the name of the website, so well-known mainstream news sources are more likely destinations. Our demographics also differ from previous research (Guess et al., 2019), suggesting fake news consumers are primarily older. The ages of our news consumption groups were not significantly different for this study, suggesting that fake news is more common with younger people than previously suggested. Notably, this may be an artifact of our MTurk sample and requires more research to investigate. A summary of our hypotheses can be found in Table 9.

8.1. Limitations

One limitation of our research is that the people sampled pre- and post-election differed. Some of our effects could potentially be a function of different people in the sample. Similarly, our sample only accounts for two different dates. The information being spread and political events were constantly changing before and after the election. This may have impacted the strength of some of our relationships. Another limitation is that our research does not account for legitimate institutions' role in pushing election fraud narratives. We capture some of this in our partisanship measures, but we do not have any measures for the direct

Table 9
Hypotheses Summary.

Hypothesis	Experiment 1 (Comparison)	Experiment 2 (Mail)	Post-election Survey
H1a	Not Supported		Not Supported
H1b	Not Supported		Not Supported
H1c	Not Supported		Supported
H2a		Not Supported	
H2b		Not Supported	
H2c		Not Supported	
H3a	Supported	Supported	Supported
H3b	Not Supported	Supported	Supported
H3c	Supported	Not Supported	Supported
H4	Not Supported	Supported	Supported

impact actors in the Republican party had on trust in the election results.

Additionally, for study 2, we found a significant chi-square difference for our partisanship demographic variable. We lacked the data to test this variable as part of a two-way ANOVA, as our experiment was not designed with this variable in mind. Future research could test this variable as part of a two-way ANOVA in addition to the variables used in this paper to better understand the interaction between partisanship, vote counting method, news consumption, and party identification.

Another potential issue is our use of an MTurk sample. We followed best practices for using MTurk samples (Hunt & Scheetz, 2019); however, the population that uses MTurk is likely to be more familiar with internet technology than the general public. This may partially explain why our pre-election survey had no significant effect with change in voting method. Lastly, our media consumption scale assigns whether a news source is considered fake news or not. Other research suggests that perceptions of what is and is not a fake news source is itself political (van der Linden et al., 2020). Future research could consider how people perceive a given source in addition to researcher news category assignment.

8.2. Implications for theory

Overall, our findings align with the literature suggesting that people search out information to confirm their prior biases (Kim et al., 2019; Kim & Dennis, 2019; Kunda, 1990; Nyhan et al., 2013). We demonstrated that this happens via social media platforms related to the election process. With the increase of information being shared through these platforms, the cultivation of trust related to potential government representatives will likely continue to be an important issue that needs further investigation.

In particular, our work contributes to the theory of motivated reasoning adapted to this study by finding that negative motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) has an influence from an IS perspective. By contextualizing to IS, we identified the effect that social media platforms have on mediating motivated reasoning biases through the spread of fake news. Previous work has identified the role of political identity (Nyhan et al., 2013; Taber et al., 2009; Taber & Lodge, 2006) as a driver of motivated reasoning bias. Our work builds upon this by showing how fake news consumption can exacerbate this relationship and provides insight into the social media platforms that direct users to these fake news sites. Future IS research could investigate additional intersections of technologies and identities that influence motivated reasoning bias.

For voting methods, we did not find significant effects in the pre-election survey. The lack of significance for in-person and mail ballots in the pre-election data is unexpected given the amount of disinformation about mail ballot fraud being disseminated leading up to and after the election (Feuer & Qiu, 2020). In the post-election survey, we did find a significant effect of voting method on vote count concern. However, this was only the case for the online group; after controlling for conservatism, there was no significant difference between mail and in-person vote counting concerns. Voters having greater concern about internet voting aligns with security consensus that a safe and secure election cannot be conducted online with current technologies in the United States (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018).

For mail ballots in the pre-election survey, neither governor-appointed officials, neutral third-party, nor machine ballot counters had a significant effect on vote count concern. This may suggest that our scenarios were somewhat artificial; for example, governors would not be appointing all ballot counters for the state. Additionally, data on ballot counting processes were only collected as part of the pre-election experiments, whereas our voting methods data were replicated after the election.

Our platforms results indicate that Facebook is having an outsized impact on directing users to fake news. We did not find a significant result for Twitter or other platforms, and on average, users that directly

navigated to news websites read mainstream sources. This suggests that, without Facebook, individuals would not discover these disinformation sources in the first place. Theoretically, this also provides empirical support that not all social media platforms are equally effective at spreading fake news, emphasizing the importance of studying the properties of individual social media platforms rather than generalizing to all platforms. There is currently a dearth of research on this topic, particularly in the government social media context (Medaglia & Zheng, 2017).

Our Facebook findings are partially corroborated by other findings around the time of the election. CrowdTangle, a public insights tool from Facebook, reported that the most-shared type of content in the days leading up to the 2020 presidential election was disinformation posts, which included unsubstantiated claims of widespread voting irregularities (Khan, 2021). The algorithm prioritizes content that maximizes user engagement, which is not optimal in this case, as unsubstantiated information is being used to activate political identities for motivated reasoning. The information system is not directly causing people to believe fake news for politically motivated reasoning, but in practice, it worsens the problem through ease of access, spread, and prioritization of said fake news. Additionally, despite a heavy reliance on artificial intelligence, Facebook algorithms have been shown to be largely unsuccessful at identifying and deleting content that violates the platform's terms of service (Seetharaman, Horwitz, & Scheck, 2021). Future research could investigate what is unique about Facebook as an IT artifact, namely the types of inputs and outputs influencing its feed algorithms and how its interface and algorithm designs may be more amenable to the spread of fake news than those of other platforms. We may also see similar results for Twitter in the future as it continues to push users off the chronological feed and towards an algorithmic feed.

Within the broader fake news literature, we establish the actual impact fake news consumption has on election belief formation. Previous research has explored impacts on COVID-19 threat perceptions (Calvillo et al., 2020) and financial markets (Clarke et al., 2021), and we extend this into an election context. Our results indicate that fake news consumption shapes perceived reality in the political context, leading to citizens having higher concern about election processes. Additionally, our adaptation of the theory of motivated reasoning adds theoretical insight into our own findings and previous findings on the interaction of confirmation bias and fake news (Kim et al., 2019; Kim & Dennis, 2019; Moravec et al., 2018; Moravec et al., 2020). Future research should investigate additional contexts to measure the actual impact that fake news is having on people and society. With disinformation being utilized during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, we expect that motivated reasoning will continue to be supported. This may explain why countries in which news is shaped and presented in accordance with how the government wants it to be perceived can enjoy citizen support for what others view as war crimes (Casciani, 2022; Rosenberg, 2022).

8.3. Implications for practice and policy

Practitioners and policymakers should take note that voter trust in the election process is in part a function of the method by which they cast their vote. Even though mail ballots have generally been established as having low levels of fraud (Weiser & Ekeh, 2020), a toxic mix of partisanship and disinformation can feed into motivated reasoning, overriding rational evaluations of the election process. We also echo the security consensus on adopting online voting with extreme caution (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018). Pairing the partisanship and disinformation effects in our data with technologies that have legitimate large-scale fraud concerns could further erode trust in the election process.

Furthermore, we urge policymakers to exercise more caution when making election fraud claims. Being able to question and verify results is a necessary part of the election process. However, most of the discourse around the 2020 election was baseless fraud claims; wild rhetoric in the

political sphere became meritless arguments in the court system (Merchant & Richer, 2020). Short-term political incentives may be enticing, but a commitment to the overall health of the electoral system must take precedence.

When considering the role that social media plays in the distribution of disinformation, it is also important to consider the impact this has on individual beliefs. As political discourses continue to be influenced by information shared over these platforms, it is important to consider what responsibilities social media platforms may have to filter this messaging. Our findings on differing platform effects suggest the importance of individual platform design decisions by social media platform developers. Such decisions could influence the power dynamics of future diplomatic issues, as was the case in the Arab Spring and as seems to be the case in the ongoing Russia conflict with Ukraine.

9. Conclusion

Through our pre- and post-election survey results, we provide insight on the interactions between partisanship, fake news, technology, and belief formation. We also adapt the theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) to the IS context and go beyond identifying fake news, instead showing how that fake news impacts the election process. Our results show that partisanship, fake news consumption, and voting method all play a significant role in the belief formation of voters, influencing their perceptions of election processes. Additionally, we find that not all social media platforms have equal effects of fake news consumption, with Facebook users being more likely to read primarily fake news in our sample than users of other platforms. Ensuring

Appendix A. Survey instrument

A.1. Pre-election survey Experiment 1 scenarios

As we approach the 2020 presidential election please consider the following scenario.

The demands of social distancing due to the novel coronavirus COVID-19 has resulted in changes to the voting process. (1) This year you will be required to vote at home using the Internet to cast your ballot. (2) This year you will be required to vote at home casting your ballot by mail. (3) This year you will be required to vote in-person at a polling place following social distancing guidelines.

A.2. Pre-election survey experiment 2 scenarios

As we approach the 2020 presidential election please consider the following scenario.

The demands of social distancing due to the novel coronavirus COVID-19 has resulted in changes to the voting process. This year you will be required to vote at home casting your ballot by mail. (1) Ballots will be counted by election officials selected by the governor of your state. (2) Ballots will be counted by a neutral third party agreed to by both republican and democrat state election officials. (3) Ballots will be counted by a vote tallying machine.

A.3. Items

Table A1

Item Text.

Item	Construct	Survey Used	Source
Given the above scenario, how concerned are you about your vote being counted in the 2020 presidential election? (1–5 Not at all Concerned to Extremely Concerned)	Vote Count Concern	Pre-election E1, E2	Self-developed
How concerned are you that your vote was not properly counted? (1–5 Not at all Concerned to Extremely Concerned)	Vote Count Concern	Post-election	Self-developed
Where do you consider yourself politically? (1–7 Very Liberal to Very Conservative)	Conservatism	All	Calvillo et al. (2020)
Where do you stand politically? (1–5 Strong Democrat to Strong Republican)	Partisan ANOVAs	All	Self-developed
What method did you use to vote in the 2020 election? (In-person, Mail, Online)	Voting Method	Post-election	Self-developed

A.4. Media consumption scale (Pre- and Post-election Surveys)

Adapted from Pennycook and Rand (2019) and Calvillo et al. (2020). Participants were not given the news category, just the name.

How much news do you get from the following sources?

continued trust in election processes will require continued research on this topic and collaboration between researchers, government officials, and social media platform maintainers.

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Julia Stachofsky: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation, Data curation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. **Ludwig Christian Schaupp:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, Supervision. **Robert E. Crossler:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, Supervision.

Declaration of interests

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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None (0), Very Little (1), Some (2), Majority (3), Most (4), All (5).

Mainstream News {CBS News, CNN, USA Today, ABC News, Washington Post, New York Times, Fox News, MSNBC, Huffington Post, Yahoo News, Chicago Tribune, BBC, New York Post, AOL News, Wall Street Journal, New York Daily News, Boston Globe, LA Times, Daily Mail, San Francisco Chronicle}.

Hyper-partisan News {Daily Wire, Conservative Tribune, News Max, The Political Insider, Breitbart, Western Journal, Daily Caller, InfoWars, Patriot Post, Daily Signal, Daily Kos, Active Post, Red State, Raw Story, Independent Journal Review, The Daily Sheeple, Antiwar, Blacklisted News, Common Dreams, Crooks and Liars}.

Fake News {Channel 24 News, Daily Buzz Live, The New York Evening, Conservative Daily Post, American News, Real News Right Now, Freedom Daily, Now 8 News, News Breaks Here, Before It's News, Your Newswire, One Political Plaza, What Does it Mean, Downtrend, Social Everything, Angry Patriot Movement, Barracuda Brigade, Clash Daily, React 365, Not Allowed To}.

A.5. Platforms scale (Post-election Survey Only)

Self-developed. Each item has a slider from 0 to 100, with the four sliders totaling 100%.

For the news sources in the previous question, what percentage of the time do you use the following platforms to access them?

Facebook.

Twitter.

Directly Navigating to Website.

Other.

A.6. Attention check

If 2 + 2 = 4 select "Agree".

Attention check was asked after the treatment for the pre-election surveys, and after the news consumption scale in the post-election survey.

Appendix B. Sample demographics

Table B1

Demographics – Study 1.

Question	In-Person (N = 77)			Mail (N = 62)			Internet (N = 67)		
	Range	Mean	Std Deviation	Range	Mean	Std Deviation	Range	Mean	Std Deviation
Very Lib - Very Con	1-7	4.29	1.849	1-7	4.18	1.946	1-7	3.96	2.033
Apolitical - Strongly Partisan	1-5	3.49	1.084	1-5	3.48	1.112	1-5	3.36	1.083
Strong Dem - Strong Rep	1-5	2.87	1.391	1-5	3.08	1.529	1-5	3	1.442
2020 Election Interest	1-5	4.13	1.092	2-5	4.39	0.837	2-5	4.25	0.876
Church Attendance	1-5	2.51*	1.465	1-5	2.71	1.508	1-5	2.52	1.481
Age	19-77	39.36	12.905	20-86	39.31	13.187	22-88	39.36	12.905
Education	2-6	4.49	1.188	1-6	4.47	1.183	1-6	4.45	1.21
Gender	Male (47); Female (30)			Male (35); Female (27)			Male (33); Female (34)		
Race	White (66); Black or African American (7); Asian (3); Some Other Race (1)			White (46); Black or African American (6); American Indian or Alaska Native (3); Asian (5); Some Other Race (2)			White (54); Black or African American (5); American Indian or Alaska Native (2); Asian (4); Some Other Race (2)		

* One missing response.

Table B2

Chi-square Tests – Study 1.

Question	Chi-Square	df	p
Very Lib - Very Con	12.97	12	0.37
Apolitical - Strongly Partisan	4.38	8	0.82
Strong Dem - Strong Rep	5.35	8	0.72
2020 Election Interest	7.60	8	0.47
Church Attendance	4.72	8	0.79
Education	10.08	10	0.43
Gender	2.03	2	0.36
Race	5.89	8	0.66

Table B3

Demographics – Study 2.

Question	Governor (N = 68)			Neutral (N = 71)			Machine (N = 95)		
	Range	Mean	Std Deviation	Range	Mean	Std Deviation	Range	Mean	Std Deviation

(continued on next page)

Table B3 (continued)

Question	Governor (N = 68)			Neutral (N = 71)			Machine (N = 95)		
	Range	Mean	Std Deviation	Range	Mean	Std Deviation	Range	Mean	Std Deviation
Very Lib - Very Con	1-7	4.06	1.984	1-7	3.9	1.914	1-7	4.12	1.972
Apolitical - Strongly Partisan	2-5	3.72	0.944	2-5	3.49	1.054	1-5	3.46	1.156
Strong Dem - Strong Rep	1-5	2.93	1.509	1-5	2.65	1.321	1-5	2.96	1.421
2020 Election Interest	1-5	4.25	0.92	1-5	4.01	1.035	1-5	4.08	1.007
Church Attendance	1-5	2.66	1.551	1-5	2.59	1.479	1-5	2.55	1.521
Age	20-98	42.21	16.747	20-98	38.34	12.423	19-73	40.11	12.806
Education	2-6	4.41	1.2	2-6	4.72	0.929	1-6	4.68	1.055
Gender	Male (41); Female (27)			Male (43); Female (28)			Male (51); Female (44)		
Race	White (58); Black or African American (5); American Indian or Alaska Native (1); Asian (3); Some Other Race (1)			White (54); Black or African American (6); American Indian or Alaska Native (2); Asian (8); Some Other Race (1)			White (79); Black or African American (6); American Indian or Alaska Native (2); Asian (8); Some Other Race (1)		

Table B3
Chi-square Tests – Study 2.

Question	Chi-Square	df	p
Very Lib - Very Con	11.47	12	0.49
Apolitical - Strongly Partisan	18.38	8	0.02
Strong Dem - Strong Rep	7.40	8	0.49
2020 Election Interest	4.66	8	0.79
Church Attendance	3.95	8	0.86
Education	11.42	10	0.33
Gender	1.05	2	0.59
Race	3.53	8	0.90

Table B4
Demographics – Study 3.

Question	In-Person (N = 217)			Mail (N = 82)			Internet (N = 12)		
	Range	Mean	Std Deviation	Range	Mean	Std Deviation	Range	Mean	Std Deviation
Very Lib - Very Con	1-7	4.15	1.964	1-7	3.09	1.730	2-7	5.33	1.723
Apolitical - Strongly Partisan	1-5	3.21	1.072	1-5	3.30	1.183	1-5	3.33	1.231
Strong Dem - Strong Rep	1-5	2.65	1.407	1-5	2.21	1.225	1-5	3.08	1.676
Church Attendance	1-5	2.85	1.462	1-5	1.91	1.372	1-5	3.83	1.267
Age	22-91	38.65	11.645	20-68	38.05	10.359	28-82	42.67	18.715
Education	1-6	4.57	1.070	1-6	4.17	1.341	5-6	5.08	0.289
Gender	Male (136); Female (81)			Male (44); Female (38)			Male (9); Female (3)		
Race	White (183); Black or African American (20); Asian (11); Some Other Race (3)			White (64); Black or African American (8); Asian (8); Some Other Race (2)			White (11); Asian (1)		

Table B5
Chi-square Tests – Study 3.

Question	Chi-Square	df	p
Very Lib - Very Con	31.90	12	0.001
Apolitical - Strongly Partisan	7.14	8	0.52
Strong Dem - Strong Rep	16.93	8	0.03
Church Attendance	39.95	8	<0.001
Education	22.32	10	0.01
Gender	3.09	2	0.21
Race	4.26	6	0.64

Appendix C. Descriptive statistics

Table C1

Descriptive Statistics – Study 1.

Measure		Mean	SE	SD	Variance	Skewness	SE	Kurtosis	SE
In-Person (N = 67)	Count Concern	3.134	0.169	1.381	1.906	-0.070	0.293	-1.224	0.578
	Mainstream News Consumption	1.540	0.150	1.229	1.510	0.918	0.293	-0.393	0.578
	Hyper-partisan News Consumption	0.981	0.173	1.414	1.998	1.130	0.293	-0.210	0.578
	Fake News Consumption	0.987	0.178	1.458	2.125	1.044	0.293	-0.543	0.578
Mail (N = 62)	Count Concern	3.645	0.171	1.344	1.806	-0.697	0.304	-0.626	0.599
	Mainstream News Consumption	1.754	0.162	1.276	1.628	0.433	0.304	-1.197	0.599
	Hyper-partisan News Consumption	1.254	0.188	1.478	2.185	0.688	0.304	-1.255	0.599
	Fake News Consumption	1.195	0.189	1.489	2.217	0.690	0.304	-1.244	0.599
Internet (N = 77)	Count Concern	3.416	0.142	1.250	1.562	-0.467	0.274	-0.817	0.541
	Mainstream News Consumption	1.524	0.140	1.228	1.509	0.657	0.274	-0.982	0.541
	Hyper-partisan News Consumption	1.103	0.163	1.433	2.052	0.801	0.274	-1.074	0.541
	Fake News Consumption	1.115	0.170	1.493	2.228	0.791	0.274	-1.124	0.541

Table C2

Descriptive Statistics – Study 2.

Measure		Mean	SE	SD	Variance	Skewness	SE	Kurtosis	SE
Governor (N = 68)	Count Concern	3.206	0.164	1.356	1.838	-0.313	0.291	-1.088	0.574
	Mainstream News Consumption	2.721	0.151	1.244	1.547	0.638	0.291	-0.615	0.574
	Hyper-partisan News Consumption	2.156	0.189	1.558	2.429	0.888	0.291	-0.880	0.574
	Fake News Consumption	2.164	0.192	1.580	2.498	0.840	0.291	-1.049	0.574
Neutral (N = 71)	Count Concern	3.169	0.153	1.287	1.657	-0.242	0.285	-1.081	0.563
	Mainstream News Consumption	2.685	0.145	1.221	1.490	0.606	0.285	-0.937	0.563
	Hyper-partisan News Consumption	2.146	0.171	1.445	2.088	0.777	0.285	-1.070	0.563
	Fake News Consumption	2.122	0.169	1.422	2.022	0.710	0.285	-1.234	0.563
Machine (N = 95)	Count Concern	3.568	0.132	1.285	1.652	-0.800	0.247	-0.446	0.490
	Mainstream News Consumption	2.657	0.134	1.304	1.699	0.721	0.247	-0.636	0.490
	Hyper-partisan News Consumption	2.178	0.162	1.577	2.487	0.880	0.247	-0.851	0.490
	Fake News Consumption	2.134	0.160	1.561	2.437	0.913	0.247	-0.792	0.490

Table C3

Descriptive Statistics – Study 3.

Measure		Mean	SE	SD	Variance	Skewness	SE	Kurtosis	SE
In-Person (N = 217)	Count Concern	2.756	0.102	1.497	2.241	0.049	0.165	-1.509	0.329
	Mainstream News Consumption	1.936	0.089	1.318	1.736	0.265	0.165	-1.330	0.329
	Hyper-partisan News Consumption	1.471	0.105	1.552	2.407	0.396	0.165	-1.476	0.329
	Fake News Consumption	1.467	0.105	1.550	2.402	0.350	0.165	-1.534	0.329
Mail (N = 82)	Count Concern	1.915	0.151	1.372	1.882	1.246	0.266	0.059	0.526
	Mainstream News Consumption	1.182	0.119	1.079	1.164	1.543	0.266	1.520	0.526
	Hyper-partisan News Consumption	0.621	0.142	1.287	1.656	1.909	0.266	2.103	0.526
	Fake News Consumption	0.593	0.140	1.264	1.596	1.878	0.266	1.923	0.526
Internet (N = 12)	Count Concern	4.083	0.288	0.996	0.992	-0.854	0.637	-0.014	1.232
	Mainstream News Consumption	3.358	0.272	0.941	0.885	-0.710	0.637	0.067	1.232
	Hyper-partisan News Consumption	3.133	0.329	1.141	1.302	-0.583	0.637	-0.554	1.232
	Fake News Consumption	3.167	0.334	1.156	1.336	-0.864	0.637	-0.121	1.232

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